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Start free trial →Lex Fridman Podcast · Ideas & Essays · November 2026
Lex asked what Kofman predicted and got wrong about the 2022 invasion. One lesson, he says, is that knowing two militaries isn't the same as knowing how they will fight each other, which makes league-table rankings misleading.
…fighting battles, then you don't have a campaign. Okay, you have maybe good ways of fighting a war, but you haven't thought through how you're going to win it. You don't have a campaign thought through. It's not obvious how the battles you're fighting are going to aggregate to military success.
…failures and what were the effective decisions on the Russian side and the Ukrainian side in the early days and the early months of the war. Maybe, Mike, you could also talk about what you predicted and what turned out to be a correct prediction and what turned out to be not a correct prediction.
…perform not only did they perform much better, but Ukraine volunteers show up to fight in those early moments. But it's a very chaotic early period of the war, the initial clash and reconciliation of the Russian invasion and the Ukrainian defense. I think one challenge that analysts have, and folks who look at analysis, is in understanding that military power by itself cannot be abstracted. I often see it abstracted in conversations, a sense that the United States is number one, and China's number two, and Russia's maybe number three or four or five, wherever you want to put it. But there's no such thing. Military power requires a context to express itself, right? So if you're thinking of a potential, let's say, battle between the United States and China over Taiwan, you have one scenario in mind. If you're thinking of maybe a war between China and India, you have a different scenario in mind. So this abstraction isn't helpful. It actually really matters what the scenario is because the geography matters, the political objectives matter. They will drive…
What surprised you the most?
What surprised me the most, first, how the Russians actually conceived of this operation, the fact that they had fairly leveraged and fairly brittle force without any real plan B. There's no hedge in their invasion plan. Second, how poorly they performed at the tactical level, just in terms of…
Yeah, and I guess there's a bunch of things when you're speaking to the reality of war just went wrong. Like there's the columns of tanks going towards Kiev that weren't affected. When you take a military force and it connects with the reality of the geography, the situation, then you actually get…