WB

Winnona Bernsen

Things Winnona Says on Podcasts

Where to Find Them

Winnona Bernsen has been a guest on The Lawfare Podcast (2 times) and The Lawfare Podcast: Patreon Edition (2 times) .

Recently: “Lawfare Archive: The Offensive Cyber Industry and U.S.-China Relations with Winnona Bernsen” on The Lawfare Podcast: Patreon Edition (November 2026); “Lawfare Archive: The Offensive Cyber Industry and U.S.-China Relations with Winnona Bernsen” on The Lawfare Podcast (November 2026); “Lawfare Daily: The Offensive Cyber Industry and U.S.-China Relations with Winnona Bernsen” on The Lawfare Podcast: Patreon Edition (July 2025); “Lawfare Daily: The Offensive Cyber Industry and U.S.-China Relations with Winnona Bernsen” on The Lawfare Podcast (July 2025).

What They Said

“The Chinese government deliberately depresses payment of vulnerabilities instead of the U.S. model, which by contrast has huge, huge margins. So at least, for hackers who may be listening to the Lawfare podcast out in Asia, like, we'll pay you better. That's probably my rallying cry, though, to the government is to treat these hackers like the strategic resources that we are.” — Winnona Bernsen, The Lawfare Podcast

In her closing answer on how the US can keep offensive cyber talent away from China, Bernsen says vulnerability researchers are now a strategic resource and should be treated like one.

The Lawfare Podcast · 2026-11-21 Permalink → Listen →
The Lawfare Podcast Around 35:36 into the episode
Speaker 1

…signaled, sure, you can provide these services that are crucial to our national security, but we're not going to help you if even the Hermit Kingdom decides to go after you. I think that that's something that the US government should change. Especially if they want to support this sort of research.

Justin Sherman

…is recommendations to limit China's access to some of these offensive cyber capabilities while ensuring the United States has continued access to the right talent. I'm wondering if you could explain to us how you think the United States government and country generally can make that happen.

Speaker 1

Oh, saving the spiciest question for last, Justin, I'll say that in 2017, Chihuahua, the CEO at the time of Chihuahua60, which is currently on our U.S. government entities list, stated that vulnerabilities are now a national strategic resource. And I think that the U.S. government is only really now in the year 2025 catching up and realizing that that is the case. And so we are in a little bit of a disadvantage just from a temporal perspective. We're eight years behind. And so at this point, Chinese firms, Chinese vulnerability researchers, Chinese offensive security conferences are already reaching out to the international community and saying, hey, come work with us, come work with us. Which is kind of interesting when you think about the fact that there's only a couple of thousand people who are really in this game and in this industry seriously, and only probably in the low hundreds of people who can do this job really well. And so the U.S. government should be cooperating with allies to work with some of the best minds in East Asia, in South America, in Europe. I mean, if we're thinking about China's backyard, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, all of…

Justin Sherman

That's all the time we have. Winona, thank you for coming on.

Speaker 1

Thank you so much for having me.

Justin Sherman

The Lawfair podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad-free versions of this and other Lawfair podcasts by becoming a Lawfair materials supporter through our website, lawfairmedia.org/slash support. You'll also get access to special events and other content…

Speaker names come from our own diarization. The position is estimated from where the line sits in the episode.
“China produces every year more STEM grads than the United States produces college grads. Fundamentally, from a population perspective, it's statistically more likely that China will have more people in the offensive security space. And in a highly manual field like vulnerability research … having more bodies and people in headcount to throw at offensive cyber should cause policymakers some concern.” — Winnona Bernsen, The Lawfare Podcast

Asked what China's pipeline of offensive hackers means for the US, Bernsen says the core issue is sheer scale in a field that still depends on manual work. She goes on to warn that AI could change that.

The Lawfare Podcast · 2026-11-21 Permalink → Listen →
The Lawfare Podcast Around 27:52 into the episode
Speaker 1

…and then the offensive operations being broader and faster. Sometimes at the expense of deniability. The Chinese government doesn't necessarily care about getting caught. And so you see these two separate models that inherently showcase why we're valuing certain things in cyberspace.

Justin Sherman

In your mind, what are the biggest national security or cybersecurity or policy broadly issues that China's offensive cyber pipeline raises for the United States?

Speaker 1

I think, and this is kind of a common theme throughout this discussion, that the issue is really scale. I really like this fact a lot. China produces every year more STEM grads than the United States produces college grads. Fundamentally, from a population perspective, it's statistically more likely that China will have more people in the offensive security space. And in a highly manual field like vulnerability research, where even though you're producing software, this software does not necessarily scale. Having more bodies and people in headcount to throw at offensive cyber should cause policymakers some concern. On top of that, I write in the report that China is already working to integrate artificial intelligence into its exploit, discovery, and offensive operations, which means that they might have at…

Justin Sherman

Let's end with some of your recommendations. You highlight that the U.S. procurement pipeline is more or less dominated, you mentioned this earlier, by large prime contractors and that it can, as in other areas, be difficult sometimes for a small business or an individual to compete. How might we…

Speaker 1

Justin, are you asking me to fix the DOD contracting system? Pretty much in one

Justin Sherman

to two sentences would be good. Thank you.

Speaker names come from our own diarization. The position is estimated from where the line sits in the episode.
“The zero-day market is a billion-dollar industry that sells software. That's ultimately what a zero-day exploit is. It's code. And this code just happens to take advantage of mistakes in commonly used products. … It's not going to be a perfect weapon. Potentially there's mistakes in that software too, or that software isn't entirely reliable.” — Winnona Bernsen, The Lawfare Podcast

The host noted that people imagine zero-day exploits as cyber superweapons. Bernsen pushes back and describes a commercial software trade with its own bugs.

The Lawfare Podcast · 2026-11-21 Permalink → Listen →
The Lawfare Podcast Around 11:36 into the episode
Speaker 1

…into plenty of systems without one, especially if people don't install the latest software update. And also there's always phishing. But a zero day allows an attacker to break into modern, up-to-date systems, which are kind of the ones with strategic value to great powers like the US or China.

Justin Sherman

…zero days and related capabilities, including to be sold to governments. So talk to us about what that industry looks like globally for offensive cyber capabilities and who are some of the major players, maybe some that folks might be familiar with and others that they are likely unfamiliar with.

Speaker 1

Yeah, for sure. Thanks, Justin. I think, oh man, where to start? I think the biggest thing that people need to understand, and it's super easy, kind of like you said, to imagine a zero-day vulnerability or zero-day exploit as like the closest thing to a cyber weapon, you know, quote unquote, that exists. But ultimately, the zero-day market is a billion-dollar industry that sells software. That's ultimately what a zero-day exploit is. It's code. And this code just happens to take advantage of mistakes in commonly used products. And that's the way that I kind of think about it, because it's not going to be a perfect weapon. You know, potentially there's mistakes in that software too, or that software isn't entirely reliable. It's not going to be 100% accurate because it's all made by, like all other software, engineers and hackers. And going back to your point about this industry. Not really being in government, just…

Justin Sherman

What does it take for a business to succeed in this area and to effectively create and then sell one of these zero-day exploits you're talking about?

Speaker 1

Ooh, that's a great question. So I'll say creating and selling a zero day are two almost entirely separate verticals. Fundamentally, when you're creating a zero day, what that requires is talent. You have to be able to find a vulnerability in a widely used technology product or system. And how you…

Justin Sherman

To deviate for just a second, Winona, now that you mention it, you highlighted some, I found this fascinating in the report, specific numbers on what that markup can look like from the original developer of a zero-day exploit to the middleman reseller to the end buyer. Can you just tell us what…

Speaker names come from our own diarization. The position is estimated from where the line sits in the episode.
“It's not like you can kind of waltz up to the NSA and go, hi, I have this fun bug. Would you like to buy it? And so if you don't know a government customer, you'll probably want to find a middleman, which is where things get a little bit more sketchy because you don't necessarily know who will end up using your zero day, especially when middlemen sell to other middlemen.” — Winnona Bernsen, The Lawfare Podcast

Asked what it takes to make and sell a zero-day exploit, the cyber policy researcher says building one takes months of skilled work, and that selling one is a separate and murkier problem. The episode is an archive rebroadcast of a 2025 interview.

The Lawfare Podcast · 2026-11-21 Permalink → Listen →
The Lawfare Podcast Around 13:09 into the episode
Speaker 1

…you also have these huge brokers and marketplaces. So firms that act as middlemen to go get a zero day and then sell it onward to either another middleman or a government. And then underpinning all of this are smaller subcontractors, startups, and individual hackers. It's a really robust ecosystem.

Justin Sherman

What does it take for a business to succeed in this area and to effectively create and then sell one of these zero-day exploits you're talking about?

Speaker 1

…or every iPhone all the way back to 2014? And so that process in itself of creating a zero day or an O Day, as some people call it, can take, at least nowadays in modern software, between six to 18 months to go from nothing to something marketable. Now, selling is actually where it gets even more complicated. Now that you have an O Day, you need to know a customer or get in touch with one. And it's not like you can kind of waltz up to the NSA and go, hi, I have this fun bug. Would you like to buy it? And so if you don't know a government customer, you'll probably want to find a middleman, which is where things get a little bit more sketchy because you don't necessarily know who will end up using your zero day, especially when middlemen sell to other middlemen. And so you get this weird, murky industry where there's markups and bugs that are going for crazy prices. And then you have this lack of trust on the consumer side.

Justin Sherman

To deviate for just a second, Winona, now that you mention it, you highlighted some, I found this fascinating in the report, specific numbers on what that markup can look like from the original developer of a zero-day exploit to the middleman reseller to the end buyer. Can you just tell us what…

Speaker 1

Sure. So with the caveat that this industry is super murky and what I've reported on is really only likely a sliver of what the global market looks like. I've had interviews where people have said it's anywhere from double to triple to 10x the markup. The quote that I've put into the report…

Justin Sherman

I just found that fascinating. And I think, as we're saying, if we think of these as highly valuable, as you mentioned, the idea that governments are paying so much, not necessarily or inherently because it's valuable and difficult to procure per se, but because of a markup is really, really…

Speaker names come from our own diarization. The position is estimated from where the line sits in the episode.

Collections They Appear In